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The effectiveness of imperfect weighting in advice taking
Peter Bednarik∗† Thomas Schultze‡
Abstract
We investigate decision-making in the Judge-Advisor-System where one person, the “judge”, wants to estimate the
number of a certain entity and is given advice by another person. The question is how to combine the judge’s initial estimate
and that of the advisor in order to get the optimal expected outcome. A previous approach compared two frequently applied
strategies, taking the average or choosing the better estimate. In most situations, averaging produced the better estimates.
However, this approach neglected a third strategy that judges frequently use, namely a weighted mean of the judges’ initial
estimate and the advice. We compare the performance of averaging and choosing to weighting in a theoretical analysis. If
the judge can, without error, detect ability differences between judge and advisor, a straight-forward calculation shows that
weighting outperforms both of these strategies. More interestingly, after introducing errors in the perception of the ability
differences, we show that such imperfect weighting may or may not be the optimal strategy. The relative performance of
imperfect weighting compared to averaging or choosing depends on the size of the actual ability differences as well as the
magnitude of the error. However, for a sizeable range of ability differences and errors, weighting is preferable to averaging
and more so to choosing. Our analysis expands previous research by showing that weighting, even when imperfect, is an
appropriate advice taking strategy and under which circumstances judges benefit most from applying it.
Keywords: advice taking, judge-advisor-system, rational behavior, normative model.
1 Introduction
A famous saying holds that “two heads are better than
one”. Accordingly, when making important judgments
we rarely do so on our own. Instead, we consult oth-
ers for advice in the hope that our advisor will provide
us with additional insights, expert knowledge or an out-
side perspective - in short, an independent second opin-
ion. Previous research on advice taking has consistently
shown that heeding advice does, in fact, increase the accu-
racy of judgments (e.g., Gino & Schweitzer, 2008; Min-
son, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal,
2004). However, a commonly observed phenomenon is
the suboptimal utilization of advice, that is, judges do not
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heed the advice as much as they should according to its
quality (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Klein-
berger, 2000); for reviews see Bonaccio and Dalal (2006);
Yaniv (2004). As a consequence, the de facto improve-
ment in judgment quality observed in many judge-advisor
studies is inferior to the improvement that judges could
have obtained if they had utilized the advice in the opti-
mal way (Minson & Mueller, 2012). The critical ques-
tion, however, is what constitutes the optimal advice tak-
ing strategy. Our main goal is to provide an answer to this
question that goes beyond previous research. To this end,
we will first discuss the existing approach on the optimal
utilization of advice and, then, build on it to arrive at a
normative model of advice taking.
Our analysis will build on the logic of the framework
commonly used for studying advice taking, the judge-
advisor-system (JAS, Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). In the
JAS, one person (the “judge”) first makes an initial esti-
mate regarding a certain unknown quantity and then re-
ceives advice in the form of the estimate another person
(the “advisor”), provided independently. The judge then
makes a final, and possibly revised, estimate. Comparison
of the initial and final estimates allows one to determine
the degree to which the judge utilized the advice, and ad-
vice utilization is usually expressed as the percent weight
of the advice when making the final estimate (e.g., Har-
vey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). How
strongly should the judge heed the advice in order to come
up with the best possible final estimate? So far, our under-
standing of the optimal degree of advice utilization is lim-
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ited. In situations in which judge and advisor are known
to be equally competent or in which comparable expertise
is the best assumption—for example when judge and ad-
visor are drawn from the same population and there is no
valid information on their relative expertise—the norma-
tively correct strategy is to average the initial estimate and
the advice (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Soll & Larrick,
2009; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Similarly, for multi-
ple decision makers, the boundary condition for individ-
ual experts to be more accurate than the crowd average is
very high (“wisdom of the crowd”, Davis-Stober, Bude-
scu, Dana, & Broomell, 2014). However, for situations
in which there are ability differences between judge and
advisor, determining the optimal advice taking strategy is
more difficult.
One approach to answering the question is to employ
more general models of judgmental aggregation that are
concerned with tapping into the wisdom of the crowds
(e.g., Davis-Stober et al., 2014; Einhorn, Hogarth, &
Klempner, 1977; Mannes, Soll, & Larrick, 2014). These
models aim at minimizing judgment errors by combin-
ing several judgments in the most sensible fashion. De-
spite differing in the underlying assumptions and/or the
error measures applied, these models consistently reveal
that averaging the individual judgments is a very effective
strategy. In addition, simple averaging can usually be out-
performed by choosing the supposedly best—or a small
subset of particularly competent—judges if there are suf-
ficient data to reliably identify the experts. One reason for
the prevalence of averaging as the most robust strategy—
particularly when compared to weighted averages—is the
high number of individual judgments and the associated
inflation of errors when trying to estimate their relative
accuracy (Dawes, 1979).
However, this error inflation might be less of a problem
in classic judge-advisor systems with only two judgments.
We, therefore, now turn to the more specific question
of the optimal aggregation of opinions in judge-advisor
dyads. To the best of our knowledge, the only formal
model that addresses the question of optimal advice uti-
lization in the face of ability differences between judge
and advisor is the PAR model by Soll and Larrick (2009).
1.1 The PAR model of advice taking
The PAR model makes statements about the effectiveness
of advice taking strategies based on the three parameters
of the JAS, ability differences between judge and advi-
sor (A), the probability of the judge detecting these differ-
ences (P), and the degree to which the two judgments con-
tain redundant information (R). Based on these parame-
ters, the PAR model compares two very specific weighting
strategies, namely equal weighting (i.e., averaging) and
choosing the supposedly more accurate estimate. Aver-
aging is a powerful strategy because it is a statistical truth
that the arithmetic mean of the judges’ initial estimate and
the advice is, on average, equally or more accurate than
the initial estimate (Soll & Larrick, 2009). If the advisor’s
estimate is independent from the judge’s initial estimate,
averaging the initial estimate and the advice results in a re-
duction of unsystematic and—in some cases—systematic
errors (Soll & Larrick, 2009; Yaniv, 2004).
The averaging strategy performs best if judge and advi-
sor are equally competent. However, usually one judge is
better. Averaging is unlikely to be optimal when the differ-
ence is large enough. The critical question, then, is how
judges should utilize advice when they perceive it to be
more or less accurate than their own initial estimates. The
PAR model offers an alternative to averaging in the form
of the choosing strategy, that is, the judge either maintains
the initial estimate or fully adopts the advice, depending
on which of the two estimates he or she thinks is more
accurate.
The theoretical analysis of the performance of the two
advice taking strategies suggests that judges should av-
erage their initial estimate and the advice in most of the
cases. That is, even if judge and advisor differ in their abil-
ity, averaging often provides better results than choosing.
The exceptions to this rule are situations in which there are
strong and easily identifiable ability differences, and the
advantage of choosing increases even more if judge and
advisor share a systematic bias. In those cases, judges are
usually better off simply choosing the supposedly more
accurate estimate.
A possible downside of the PAR model is its focus on
only two advice taking strategies. Soll and Larrick (2009)
provide strong arguments for this restriction, namely that
these strategies are simple to use and that these strategies,
averaging and choosing, account for about two thirds of
the strategy choices in advice taking. They back up this
argument with data from four experiments showing that
judges used a choosing strategy in close to 50% of the
cases and relied on averaging in about 20% of the cases.
However, these results imply that judges also may have
adhered to a third strategy more than 30% of the time,
namely weighting. In fact, while less frequent than choos-
ing, judges seemed to prefer a weighting strategy to pure
averaging. A study by Soll and Mannes (2011) showed a
similar pattern; depending on the experimental conditions,
judges utilized a weighting strategy in about 30 to 40% of
the trials.
As previous studies (Soll & Larrick, 2009; Soll &
Mannes, 2011) show, judges seem to engage in three rather
than only two strategies when utilizing advice: choosing,
averaging, and weighting. However, the PAR model al-
lows us to compare only choosing and averaging. In order
to make claims about the appropriateness of weighting,
we require a different model that informs us about the op-
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timal weight of advice. Ideally, we want to know, for any
given constellation of a judge and an advisor who may dif-
fer with regards to their judgmental accuracy, how much
weight the judge should assign to the advice in order to
maximize the accuracy of the final estimates. Importantly,
and comparable to the PAR model, these optimal weights
need to be of normative character rather than being calcu-
lated post-hoc, that is, we need to state—a priori—which
weighting scheme has the lowest expected judgmental er-
ror. In the following, we will describe a model that—
similar to the PARmodel—determines the effectiveness of
weighted averaging based on ability differences between
judge and advisor, as well as the ability of the judge to
detect these differences. We will then compare the accu-
racy of the final estimates that would result from weight-
ing to the expected accuracy of a pure averaging strategy
as well as a choosing strategy and test under which condi-
tions weighting is the more appropriate strategy.
2 Model and results
2.1 Weighted Mean
For the purpose of our model, and in accordance with the
basic JAS, we assume that two people, a judge J and an
advisor A, are tasked with estimating an unknown quan-
tity (e.g., the distance between two cities). They first pro-
vide individual estimates, and then J wants to find the best
possible final estimate after receiving A’s estimate as ad-
vice. Let us denote J’s a priori estimate by xJ and A’s
a priori estimate by xA. The question is how to find an
optimal method for combining the information from xJ
and xA. Most present models focus on comparing meth-
ods frequently observed in empirical studies (e.g., Soll &
Larrick, 2009)1. In contrast, we seek to find the theoret-
ically optimal method. Naturally, this comes at the price
of making more bold assumptions. So, let us assume that
the estimates of both judge and advisor are independent
and drawn from a normal distribution centered on the true
1Our model differs from the PAR model in three aspects. First,
whereas both the PAR and our model assume normally distributed esti-
mates, our model makes the additional assumption of unbiased estimates
for the sake of simplicity. Second, the error measures differ: while the
PAR model measures judgment errors in terms of the mean absolute er-
ror, we chose the mean squared error due to its favorable mathematical
properties. Note, that the choice of error measures can change the re-
sults only quantitatively, but not qualitatively. That is, if one aggregation
strategy is superior to another it is so regardless of the error measure
applied. Finally, our models differ in the way the recognition of abil-
ity differences is operationalized. Whereas the PAR model models it in
terms of a correlation between two binary variables (which dyad mem-
ber is more competent vs. which dyad member does the judge perceive
to be more competent), our model treats the recognition of relative ex-
pertise as a continuous variable. This variable not only states which dyad
member is more accurate but also quantifies the magnitude of the ability
difference. The latter is necessary in order to determine the (perceived)
optimal weight of advice.
value xT with variances σ
2
J and σ
2
A. From this informa-
tion, we can compute that the most likely estimation for
the true value x˜ (using the most-likelihood method, see
Appendix 4.1) is given by
x˜ =
xJσ
2
A + xAσ
2
J
σ2J + σ
2
A
(1)
which happens to be a weighted mean2 xw
xw = wxJ + (1− w)xA (2)
of xJ and xA with the weight w.
w =
σ2A
σ2A + σ
2
J
(3)
Denoting the ability ratio bym
m =
σ2A
σ2J
(4)
we can rewrite the weighted mean xw as
xw =
m
1 +m
xJ +
1
1 +m
xA (5)
If m > 1, the judge is better than the advisor and, if
m < 1, the advisor is better than the judge. In words,
the judge needs to estimate “How much am I better at this
task than my advisor?” or “How much is my advisor bet-
ter than me?” For example, if the advisor’s error variance
is 1 arbitrary unit and the judge’s error variance is 3 of
those units, the weight that should be placed on the ad-
vice is 75%. If both error variances are equal, the optimal
strategy is to weight the advice by 50%.
Essentially, the calculation yields two intuitive insights:
first, as long as the error variance of both the judge and
the advisor is nonzero and limited, their judgments should
never be completely ignored. That is, weighting is bound
to yield more accurate judgments than choosing the more
accurate judgment. Second, the expected error of the
weighted average is always smaller or equal to that of the
arithmetic mean (they are equal if the optimal weight is
0.5, see Appendix 4.2). On a theoretical level, perfect
weighting is therefore, by definition, superior to the PAR-
models choosing and averaging strategies. In the next sec-
tion we show that errors in the perception of the ability
ratio imply that any of the three methods can be optimal,
depending on the parameters.
2If, instead of deriving the optimal method theoretically, we would re-
strict ourselves on the method of assigning linear weights (weighting) to
xA and xJ , we could compute the optimal weight by simply optimizing
the equation σ2w = (1− w)
2
σ
2
J
+ w2σ2
A
with respect to σ2w .
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Figure 1: Plots of relative improvement r of accuracy (i.e., reduction of variance) depending on the ability ratio m
after considering the advisor’s advice using three different methods: Choosing the better estimate (red plain), averaging
both estimates equally (blue dotted), and weighting the estimates according to ability ratio (green dashed). Since r is
measuring the change of variance compared to the initial estimate, r < 0 means an improvement while r > 1 means
worsening of the initial estimate. Both axes are in logarithmic scale.
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(a) Here, weighting uses the precise ability ratiom and choosing
identifies the correct expert at 100%.
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(b) The judge overestimates her ability relative to that of the ad-
visor by 200% (i.e., p = 3), resulting in imperfect weighting
and, for some values ofm, choosing the wrong estimate.
2.2 Imperfect weighting: The effect of er-
rors in assessing the ability differences
As we have demonstrated in the last subsection, perfect
weighting is superior to choosing and averaging. How-
ever, perfect weighting requires that the ability ratio be-
tween judge and advisor is known to the judge. Despite
judges’ ability to differentiate between good and bad ad-
vice beyond chance level (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997;
Harvey, Harries, & Fischer, 2000; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv &
Kleinberger, 2000) exact knowledge of m is unlikely. Let
us, accordingly, assume that m must be estimated by the
judge and is, therefore, subject to errors or biases. In
essence, regardless of whether such a mistake is system-
atic or not, the judge can either under- or over-estimate
the true value ofm, and we denote the degree to which the
judge does so by the factor p. If p equals 1, the judge has
a perfect representation of the ability ratio. In contrast,
values greater than 1 indicate that the judge’s perception
of the ability erroneously shift in his or her favor, whereas
values smaller than 1 mean that the judge overestimates
the ability of the advisor. Technically speaking, p varies
misconception by either magnifying or dampening the ra-
tio m. Thus, instead of (5) the judge’s final result reads
as
x˜(p) =
pm
1 + pm
xJ +
1
1 + pm
xA (6)
and the variance of x˜(p) is given by
σ2p =
m2p2σ2J + σ
2
A
(1 + pm)2
(7)
In this case, the final estimate by weighting the two ini-
tial estimates differently might end up being worse than
taking the simple average. This would happen if the abil-
ity ratio is (i) not very large and (ii) poorly estimated. The
weighted mean might also end up being worse than choos-
ing the better guess. This would happen if the competence
ratio is actually large, but is perceived as small. To see the
full picture we need to compare the relative improvements
r =
variance of final guess
variance of initial guess
(8)
of the judge. Values smaller than 1 indicate that the er-
ror variance of the final estimates is smaller than that of
the initial estimate, that is, the final estimates are more
accurate. In contrast, if the final estimates are less accu-
rate than the initial estimates, r will assume values greater
than 1. We determine the expected values of r for the three
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Figure 2: Contour plot of the relative difference k of averaging/weighting (a) and choosing/weighting (b). The two
methods are equally efficient at the thick black lines. In the green region weighting is more efficient while in the
blue region averaging (a) / choosing (b) are more efficient. Again, efficiency is measured in the reduction of variance
compared to the initial estimate: if weighting reduces more variance than averaging/choosing, it is more efficient. At
the thick black line, k = 1. Contour lines represent steps of 10%, i.e., k = 0.6, 0.7, ..., 1.4, 1.5
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(a) Averaging vs. weighting
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(b) Choosing vs. weighting
advice-taking strategies as a function of the parametersm
and p (except, for averaging, which does not depend on p).
For averaging, we get
raveraging(m) =
σ2a
σ2J
=
1
4
σ2J + σ
2
A
σ2J
=
1 +m
4
(9)
with the expected variance of averaging σ2a =
1
4
(σ2J+σ
2
A).
For weighting, we get
rweighting(m, p) =
σ2p
σ2J
=
m2p2σ2J + σ
2
A
(1 + pm)2σ2J
(10)
=
m2p2
(1 + pm)2
+
m
(1 + pm)2
=
m(1 + p2m)
(1 + pm)2
(11)
For choosing, we first observe that rchoosing can only be
either 1, orm. In the first case, the judge chooses her own
estimate and therefore can neither improve nor worsen. In
the latter case, the accuracy changes exactly by the com-
petence ratiom. Essentially, the judge must guess whether
m > 1 or m < 1. However, she knows only pm instead
ofm which gives
rchoosing(m, p) =
{
m, if pm < 1
1, else
(12)
Obviously, the judge does not always identify the correct
expert. This happens if either m is chosen despite m >
1 (because pm < 1) or of 1 is chosen despite m < 1
(because pm > 1). Essentially, these three r-functions
tell us how much the judge improves or worsens her initial
estimate by using either averaging, weighting or choosing.
In Figure 1, we show LogLog Plots1 with fixed p, p = 1
(left panel) and p = 3 (right panel) varying the ability ra-
tiom. In line with the reasoning above, Figure 1(a) shows
that if the judge can correctly assess the ability differ-
ences, weighting outperforms both averaging and choos-
ing. However, as we can see in Figure 1(b), the relative
performance of the three strategies differs for specific pa-
rameter regions. In our example, the judge overestimates
her ability relative to that of the advisor by 200% (i.e.,
p = 3). In this case, averaging outperforms weighting for
small ability ratios, and choosing outperforms weighting if
the advisor is substantially more accurate than the judge.
Next, we want to explore the full parameter space ofm
and p. To this end, we need to compare the relative im-
1A brief remark for readers unfamiliar with LogLog plots: Since the
variables m and r that we wish to plot are relations, we need to scale
the axes accordingly. A value ofm = 0.5 means that the judge is twice
as good as the advisor while m = 2 means that the advisor is twice as
good as the judge. Similarly form = 0.1 andm = 10. This means that
we need to treat the two intervals (0; 1) and (1;∞) equally. Further, we
must center the plot around 1 instead of 0 because a value of m = 1
indictaes equal accuracy of judge and advisor. This is accomplished by
Log(-arithmic) scaling. Double logarithmic scaling (i.e., LogLog Plots)
scales both axes logarithmically.
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provement in accuracy obtained by the different strategies
as a function of the model parameters p and m. Specif-
ically, we are interested in the relative performance of
weighting on one hand and either choosing or averaging
on the other (for an in-depth comparison of choosing and
averaging, see Soll & Larrick, 2009), which we denote as
kaveraging =
rweighting
raveraging
(13)
and
kchoosing =
rweighting
rchoosing
(14)
respectively. A value of k = 1 indicates that weighting
and the comparison strategy (averaging or choosing) per-
form equally well whereas values of k > 1 indicate supe-
rior performance of weighting, and values of k < 1 indi-
cate that the respective comparison strategy performs bet-
ter. The target value k is represented by the shade in the
contour plot spanned by the parametersm and p (see Fig-
ure 2). The bold line separating the blue and green regions
is the iso-accuracy curve which indicates that the accuracy
of the weighting strategy equals that of the comparison
strategy (i.e., k = 1). For each subsequent line in the green
area, k increases by 0.1, that is, the weighting-method per-
forms 10% better than averaging/choosing, while in the
blue area the opposite is true.
As can be seen in Figure 2a, if there are ability differ-
ences between judge and advisor and the judge has a rough
representation of these differences, weighting is superior
to simple averaging. In contrast, whenever the ability dif-
ferences are small and/or difficult to detect, judges will
benefit more from averaging. The accuracy differences be-
tween weighting and choosing are more pronounced (see
Figure 2b). Obviously, the judge must make extreme er-
rors when assessingm in order for choosing to be the bet-
ter advice taking strategy. In addition, choosing can out-
perform weighting only if correctly identifying the better
estimate. This is the case above the white diagonal in Fig-
ure 2b form > 1, and below the diagonal form < 1. Note
that the second prerequisite creates an asymmetry in the
results. This asymmetry is rooted in the fact that choos-
ing is heavily penalized if the judge erroneously chooses
the wrong estimate while weighting is much less prone to
such extreme errors because it still assigns some weight to
the more accurate judgment.
Our analysis so far revealed that weighting is quite a
powerful strategy when comparing it to either averaging
or choosing. However, one rationale that we can derive
from Soll and Larrick’s (2009) PAR model is that judges
should switch between averaging and choosing in order to
maximize the accuracy of their final estimates. Specif-
ically, they should average when ability differences are
small and/or difficult to detect and choose when the op-
posite is true. An interesting vantage point, then, is to
compare weighting to a combination of choosing and av-
eraging.
2.3 Combining averaging and choosing
Let us assume that judges know when they should switch
from averaging to choosing based on their (potentially bi-
ased) perception ofm. We can easily compute this thresh-
old by equating rchoosing and raveraging
1 +m
4
= 1 (15)
⇔ m = 3 (16)
if, choosing one self, and
1 +m
4
= m (17)
⇔ m = 1/3 (18)
if choosing the advisor. Since the judge estimates m as
pm, she will change whenever pm = 3 or pm = 1
3
. In
other words, a perfect application of the combined strat-
egy implies that judges average their initial estimates and
the advice until they perceive the initial estimates to be
three times as accurate as the advice or vice versa; if this
threshold is passed, they choose the more accurate esti-
mate. If m is estimated without error (i.e., p = 1), dy-
namically switching between choosing and averaging is a
powerful strategy. However, we have to take into account
that if p 6= 1, choosing will not always be correct, since
the judge may erroneously choose the less accurate judg-
ment. This flaw drastically reduces the performance of the
combined strategy, because choosing the wrong expert has
highly negative consequences.
In order to compare weighting to the combined strategy
of choosing and averaging, we first determine the accuracy
gains relative to the initial estimates that would result from
a combination of choosing and averaging, rcombined. Fig-
ure 3 (left panel) compares the accuracy ratios of the com-
bined strategy as well as that of weighting as a function of
m and assuming that the judge is strongly overestimating
his or her own accuracy (p = 3). We next calculated the
ratio of the accuracy gain obtained by weighting and that
obtained by the combined strategy:
kcombined =
rweighting
rcombined
(19)
The right panel of Figure 3 shows kcombined as a func-
tion of m and p. The white lines denote the threshold at
which judges switch from averaging to choosing based on
their perception of the relative accuracy of judge and advi-
sor (i.e., when the product pm is greater than 3 or smaller
than 1/3). The bold lines, again, denote the iso-accuracy-
curves. The analysis reveals some interesting findings.
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Figure 3: Comparing weighting to the combination of choosing and averaging.
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(a) Relative improvement of accuracy (as in Fig.1) of weighting
(green dashed) and the combined method (red plain), both for
p = 3. Note that imperfect estimation of m leads to choosing the
wrong judgment in a certain parameter regions.
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(b) Generalization of (a) by allowing for varying p (as in Fig.
2). In the green area, weighting is the better strategy, while in
the blue area the combined method performs better. The contour
lines denote increases or decreases in steps of 10%.
First, weighting is superior to the combined strategy in
a wide range of situations. Second, the superiority of the
weighting strategy is mostly due to the relatively weak per-
formance of choosing. The problem is that the application
of the combined strategy sometimes leads to choosing in
situations in which averaging would outperform weight-
ing but choosing does not. This happens when ability dif-
ferences are small and difficult to assess (i.e., m close to
1 and p either very small or very large). Instances where
the choosing part of the combined strategy performs better
than the weighting strategy occur only for extreme compe-
tence differences outside of the parameter range of Figure
3.
3 Discussion
The aim of our theoretical analysis was to answer the
question which advice-taking strategy judges in a judge-
advisor system should utilize in order to maximize the ac-
curacy of their revised estimates. Previous research has
suggested that judges should average their initial estimates
and the advice unless the difference in accuracy between
the two estimates is large and easily identifiable; in such
cases they should simply choose the more accurate esti-
mate (Soll & Larrick, 2009). It is a mathematical fact that
averaging two independent and unbiased estimates leads
to, on average, more accurate judgments (e.g., Larrick &
Soll, 2006; Yaniv, 2004). However, if the error variance of
the two judgments is unequal, there is an optimal weight of
advice that produces combined estimates that are always
equal or better than simple averaging with regards to accu-
racy. As a consequence, judges in a judge-advisor system
would benefit the most from weighting the advice accord-
ing to its accuracy relative to that of the judges’ initial es-
timate (D. Budescu, 2006; D. V. Budescu & Yu, 2006).
Similar to choosing the better estimate, the potential su-
periority of the weighting strategy compared to pure aver-
aging comes at the cost of additional information, namely
knowledge of the ability difference between judge and ad-
visor.
If this ability difference is known, a weighting strategy
is bound to be superior to both, averaging and choosing.
Yet, it is rather unlikely that judges will be able to cor-
rectly recognize differences between their own and their
advisor’s ability with perfect accuracy. Instead, previous
research suggests that while judges have some ability to
assess the relative quality of advice they frequently un-
derestimate it (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Harvey et
al., 2000; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). In other situations,
for example, when judges perceive the task as very dif-
ficult (Gino & Moore, 2007) or when they are very anx-
ious, they are prone to overestimate the quality of the ad-
vice relative to that of their own initial estimates (Gino,
Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012). If judges’ assessment of
the ability differences are subject to errors the resulting
weighting strategy will result in less accurate judgments,
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and if these errors become too large, simple averaging
turns out to be the better strategy. The fact that the av-
eraging strategy can outperform weighting strategies that
are based on erroneous weights has been previously doc-
umented in multi-cue judgments (Dawes, 1979), and the
advantage of averaging increases as the number of cues
grows. Hence, the first question we aimed to answer was
under which conditions imperfect weighting outperforms
averaging. To this end, we compared the expected perfor-
mance of both strategies as a function of ability differences
between judge and advisor as well as the accuracy of the
judge when estimating these differences.
Our analysis revealed that imperfect weighting outper-
forms averaging as long as there are at least moderate abil-
ity differences. This performance advantage of the weight-
ing strategy is rather robust against moderate mispercep-
tions of the ability differences. For example, if the judge’s
error was 50% larger than that of the advisor, weighting
is superior to averaging even if the judge under- or over-
estimates the ability difference by 50%. Additionally, the
larger the ability differences become the more robust the
weighting strategy becomes against erroneous assessment
of these differences. In other words, averaging is likely
to produce better estimates than imperfect weighting only
when ability differences are small and/or difficult to de-
tect.
We also compared an imperfect weighting strategy to
imperfect choosing, finding that the former outperformed
the latter with very few exceptions. Specifically, choos-
ing was superior to weighting only when there were large
differences in accuracy which the judge recognized but
severely underestimated. The reason for this finding is
that the choosing strategy is insensitive to the magnitude
of the ability differences whereas the weighting strategy is
not. Consider the case where the advisor is much more ac-
curate than the judge but the judge erroneously perceives
the advisor to be only slightly better than him- or herself.
In this case the judge will still correctly identify the advi-
sor as the expert, and because the actual difference in ex-
pertise is large, choosing the advice will produce a rather
good result. In contrast, weighting will produce a final es-
timate that is not too different from (but slightly superior
to) the one obtained by averaging because the difference
in weights is bound to be small. Based on the mispercep-
tion of the ability differences, the judge does not assign
enough weight to the advice.
Finally, we compared imperfect weighting to a strat-
egy that dynamically switches from averaging to choosing
when the (potentially biased) perceived ability differences
between judge and advisor become large (Soll & Larrick,
2009). Our analysis revealed that weighting is superior to
the combined strategy in a wide range of situations. In-
terestingly, weighting is better than the combined strat-
egy mainly because the application of the combined strat-
egy leads judges to choose between estimates in situations
where averaging would outperform weighting. These sit-
uations are characterized by the judge correctly recogniz-
ing whether the advisor is more competent than him- or
herself or vice versa, but at the same time greatly over-
estimating the ability differences. The interesting thing
about those situations is that simple averaging would have
performed better than weighting, but since the ability dif-
ferences are perceived as too high, the combined strategy
must use choosing instead.
3.1 Implications and directions for future
research
An important implication of our analysis is that weighting
is a highly effective strategy in advice taking. This find-
ing extends previous research on judgmental aggregation.
So far, the respective literature has unanimously supported
averaging as the most robust strategy when it comes to
utilizing the wisdom of the crowds (e.g., Clemen, 1989;
Davis-Stober et al., 2014; Smith & Wallis, 2009). In ad-
dition, some recent studies showed that a combination of
choosing and averaging can outperform mere averaging.
In these studies, the average of all individuals judgments
were compared to the average of a subset comprised of
the most accurate judgments (Davis-Stober et al., 2014) or
those judgments supposedly more accurate based on in-
complete historic data (Mannes et al., 2014). In contrast,
differential weighting of the individual judgments usually
performs worse than simple averaging (e.g., Dawes, 1979;
Genre, Kenny, Meyler, & Timmermann, 2013). The rea-
son for this is the inflation of errors when estimating the
optimal weights of a large set of individual judgments
(Smith & Wallis, 2009). However, in the context of the
judge-advisor dyad, the judge needs only estimate one pa-
rameter when estimating the optimal weight of advice.
Therefore, the risk of error inflation is minimal and, as
a consequence, weighting becomes a powerful strategy.
Furthermore, the fact that participants in previous stud-
ies adhered to a weighting strategy in a substantial num-
ber of trials (Soll & Larrick, 2009; Soll & Mannes, 2011)
as well as its potential superiority to averaging highlight
its importance when studying advice taking. Whereas the
PAR model suggests that judges should engage in averag-
ing in case of small or difficult to detect ability difference
and rely on choosing otherwise, our analysis makes a par-
tially different statement. In case of small and difficult to
detect ability differences, averaging is still the best option.
However, in case the ability differences become larger and
easier to detect, judges should attempt to weight the two
judgments by perceived accuracy instead of choosing be-
tween the two. Interestingly, weighting the two estimates
by their perceived accuracy allows judges to mimic an ag-
gregation strategy that has proven to be very effective if
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three or more judgments are involved, namely taking the
median. Research on group judgment (Bonner & Bau-
mann, 2008; Bonner, Gonzalez, & Sommer, 2004; Bon-
ner, Sillito, & Baumann, 2007) suggests that the way in
which groups or judges combine the individual estimates
is best described by the median or similar models that dis-
count outliers. The same is true when judges combine sev-
eral independent judgments (Yaniv, 1997) or receive ad-
vice from multiple advisors (Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007).
Importantly, the median strategy outperforms the average
because it discounts extreme judgments which are usually
less accurate. Naturally, in the JAS with only one advisor,
the median is per definition, equal to the mean, but as-
signing more weight to the more accurate judgment, even
if the weight is not optimal due to misperceptions of the
ability differences, also leads to discounting the less accu-
rate judgments.
Our theoretical analysis does not only provide a norma-
tive framework to compare the expected performance of
different advice taking strategies. It also allows to evaluate
the effectiveness of judges’ advice taking strategies. Sim-
ilar to Soll and Larrick’s (2009) empirical analysis, our
model provides performance baselines against which to
compare the de facto improvements in accuracy between
judges’ initial and final estimates. Soll and Larrick’s anal-
yses already showed that in the majority of the cases fre-
quent averagers outperformed frequent choosers. An in-
teresting question would, then, be whether or under which
conditions frequent weighting can outperform frequent av-
eraging.
Finally, a potential venue for further developing our
model would be to include biased judgments. In our theo-
retical analysis, we made the simplifying assumption that
there is no systematic bias in the judge’s and advisor’s es-
timates. Incorporating systematic biases of judge and ad-
visor will necessarily make the model more complex, but
it may be worthwhile if it allows us to draw conclusions
about the relative performance of weighting, choosing and
averaging in a wider range of decision situations.
3.2 Conclusion
Advice taking is not only an integral part of our daily so-
cial reality but also one of the most effective ways to in-
crease the quality of our judgments and decisions. In order
to make the best use of the wisdom of others, we need a
thorough understanding of how well we utilize advice de-
pending on its quality. An elegant way to provide answers
to this question is provided by normative models of ad-
vice taking. We built on and extended the most prominent
normative model of advice taking and, by doing so, fur-
thered our understanding of how effective different advice
taking strategies are in different situations. More impor-
tantly, however, normative modeling allows us to detect
and, ultimately intervene against, deviations from optimal
strategies, that is, they can help us utilize the benefits of
advice to its full effect.
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4 Appendix
4.1 Deriving the most likely final estimate
Let us assume that the estimates of both judge and advisor are independent and drawn from a normal distribution
centered on the true value xT with variances σ
2
J and σ
2
A. Since xJ and xA are drawn from independent distributions,
the density function is given by
fJA(x˜) = fJ (x˜) · fA(x˜) =
(
e
−
(xJ−x˜)
2
2σ2
J
√
1
2piσ2J
)
·
(
e
−
(xA−x˜)
2
2σ2
A
√
1
2piσ2A
)
(20)
= e
−
1
2
(
(xJ−x˜)
2
σ2
J
+
(xA−x˜)
2
σ2
A
)
·
1
2piσJσA
(21)
Optimizing with respect to x˜ gives
d
dx˜
(
log(fJA(x˜))
)
= −
1
2
d
dx˜
(
(xJ − x˜)
2
σ2J
+
(xA − x˜)
2
σ2A
)
(22)
=
1
σ2J
(xJ − x˜) +
1
σ2A
(xA − x˜) = 0 (23)
Solving (23) for x˜ gives
x˜ =
xJσ
2
A + xAσ
2
J
σ2J + σ
2
A
(24)
which is a weighted average of xJ and xA.
x˜ =
xJσ
2
A + xAσ
2
J
σ2J + σ
2
A
(25)
4.2 Weighting almost always outperforms averaging
We compare the weighted average (2) with the arithmetic (non-weighted) average x¯.
x¯ =
1
2
(xA + xB) (26)
First, let us recall that for any random variable X and a real number a holds
Var(aX) = a2Var(X) (27)
Further, ifX and Y follow independent Gaussian distributions (µX , σX
2) and (µY , σY
2), respectively, then alsoX+Y
follows a Gaussian distribution with expected value µX+Y = µY + µY and variance σX+Y
2 = σX
2 + σY
2.
Now we look at the distributions of x˜ and x¯. Since they are both linear transformations of xJ and xA we can directly
apply the above two rules. Thus, x˜ and x¯ follow a Gaussian distribution with expected value xT and the respective
variances
σ2w =
σ2Jσ
2
A
σ2J + σ
2
A
(28)
σ2a =
1
4
(σ2J + σ
2
A) (29)
where σ2w is the variance of the weighted mean and σ
2
a is the variance of the arithmetic mean. Then σw ≤ σa with
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equality only if σA = σB , because
σ2w ≤ σ
2
A (30)
σ2Jσ
2
A
σ2J + σAB
2
≤
1
4
(σ2J + σ
2
A) (31)
4σ2Jσ
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A ≤ (σ
2
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2
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4σ2Jσ
2
A ≤ σ
4
J + 2σ
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4
A (33)
0 ≤ σ4J − 2σ
2
Jσ
2
A + σ
4
A (34)
0 ≤ (σ2J − σ
2
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2
(35)
